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working force, 167 and that seniority drives the most able men to other fields.'08
But the vigor of this opposition was somewhat lessened by the tendency of
seniority to stabilize the working force.'6 0 The holder of even an unat-
tractive job will think twice before abandoning it if abandonment means the
loss of hard-earned seniority and perhaps the necessity of starting again
at the bottom of the seniority ladder. And this reduction of labor turn-
over of course effects considerable economies for the employer by reducing
the costs incident to the training of new men.170
The social effects of seniority are perhaps not altogether desirable. The
stabilizing tendency of seniority may operate to stifle initiative, enterprise
and self-reliance. In the process of crystallization of the social structure
seniority tends to emphasize class distinctions; a man's permanent place
threatens to become, in the long run, his "proper" place. The stability of
employment engendered by seniority is likely to produce stereotyped pat-
terns of occupation, environment, income and education, which stamp the
man and impair his ability to shift from one social stratum to another. But
developments like these would seem only to reflect more general prevailing
trends.
MORTGAGES ON FUTURE CROPS AS SECURITY
FOR GOVERNMENT LOANS
ALTHOUGH the crop mortgage has long been recognized as a basis of credit
extension to farmers, the practical implications of this particular security
device have recently assumed an unprecedented significance in view of the
activities of the various federal agencies in charge of agricultural relief.1
These agencies, of which the Farm Security Administration2 is a notable
167. See Louisville & N. R. R. v. Bryant, 263 Ky. 578, 584, 92 S. W." (2d) 749,
752 (1936).
168. (1936) 100 RAILwAY AGE 846.
169. See THE SENIORITY RuLEs OF THE NATIONAL AGREEMENT, Op. cit. supra note 1,
at 6 et seq.; FEDERAL CO-ORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, op. cit. supra note 148, at 119.
170. See Douglas, Problem of Labor Turnover, (1918) 8 AMER. EcoN. REV. 306;
Labor Turnover, 8 ENcyc. Soc. ScmNcEs 709. Many employers now accept seniority
as an established system. See note 6, upra.
1.. For an evaluation of the work of federal agencies in financing agriculture and
for a description of their administrative structure, see Johnson, Short Term Farm Credit
Situation in the United States (1935) 17 J. FARM EcoN. 277; Murray, Farm Mortgages
and the Government (1935) 17 J. FARM EcoN. 613; Preston, Our Farm Credit Sys-
tem (1936) 18 J. FARM EcoN. 673.
2. The Farm Security Administration was established on September 2, 1937, at
which time its predecessor, the Resettlement Administration, was abolished. See N. Y.
Times, Sept. 2, 1937, p. 6, col. 4; U. S. News, Sept. 6, 1937, p. 3, col. 2. The Resettle-
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example, have made numerous loans intended to alleviate the farmers' tem-
porary economic distress.3 But, in obtaining security for their extensions of
credit, the agencies are frequently handicapped by the fact that farm lands
are often heavily encumbered with debt and hence afford little security for
additional obligations. 4 Since the farmer may thus have no present unencum-
bered property interest which he can put up as security for the advance, the
government must frequently rely upon a mortgage on the crop which the bor-
rower intends to cultivate with the proceeds of the loan.5 Because of the diffi-
culties which mortgagees have historically encountered in acquiring and en-
forcing crop mortgage liens, this reliance by the government on the crop
mortgage device suggests an analysis of the various common law rules and
statutory provisions upon which the modern crop mortgage is based in order
to understand the problems confronting the federal agencies in connection
with their extension of credit on the basis of this security device.
The initial problem facing the prospective crop mortgagee is whether or
not he can secure his loan by a miortgage on property not yet in being. Al-
though it -has often been stated that mortgages on after-acquired chattels are
void at common law,6 mortgages on future crops have generally been upheld7
on various rationales. Thus, an exception to the common law rule has at times
been found in the doctrine of "potential possession" by which a farmer is
enabled to mortgage his interest in the products of his land and the increase
of his herd.8 By this doctrine the mortgage is said to give the mortgagee an
immediate interest in the chattels, which ripens into a legal lien once they have
come into existence and is superior to any intervening claims that may have
arisen since the original transaction.0 This doctrine, however, is seldom fully
applied, even to the increase of animals or to the yield of perennial plants10
Mortgages on future crops are more commonly upheld upon the theory that
the creditor's loan, made in reliance on the debtor's promise to mortgage per-
sonal property, subsequently to be acquired, gives rise to an equitable lien on
ment Administration was set up on April 30,1935, by Executive Order of the President,
No. 7027, under authority of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, 49 STAT.
115 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 728, note (Supp. 1936).
3. The loans made by the Resettlement Administration alone for the years 1935-1936
amounted to $75,600,000. See Rns r=mn Nr AD liI xStEAoz, Fmsr A zfuAL RExon
(1936) 4, 161-162.
4. Id. at 3.
5. See REsErrmrmNT ADmXINISTRATiON, INTERmr Rmr'onr (April 1936) 9.
6. WALSH, MORTGAGES (1934) § 10; Comment (1925) 34 YAxM L. J. 175, 176.
7. 1 Jo.-TEs, CHATrEL MORTGAGES AND CoaDmioNAL SALs (6th ed. 1933) §§ 143,
170-174.
8. Michigan Sugar Co. v. Falkenhagen, 243 Mich. 693, 220 N. IV. 760 (1928); see
1 JohN-s, op. cit. supra note 7, § 140; (1929) 14 IovrA L Rnv. 363. This doctrine stems
from the English case of Grantham v. Hawley, Hob. 132 (1616). It has been given
considerable lip service by American courts.
9. 1 WULISTON, SALTS (2d ed. 1924) §§ 133-136.
10. See Comment (1924) 10 VA. L. REv. 393, 394.
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the property as soon as it comes into being.1 There is, however, a substan-
tial divergence of opinion as to the nature and scope of the equitable interest
thereby created in the crop mortgagee. In some jurisdictions, the crop mort-
gagee obtains a priority as against all but purchasers and encumbrancers who
have given value without actual or constructive notice of the mortgage,12
while, in others, the mortgage lien is of no avail as against liens which have
attached before the mortgagee has taken possession of the mortgaged crops.13
At least one state denies all practical effect to such transactions by holding that
the mortgagee obtains merely a revocable license to enter and take possession
of the mortgaged property, and that the mortgagor can avoid this license at
will. 14 In many states the status of the crop mortgagee has been clarified by
statutes which expressly permit mortgages on future crops but which often
restrict the scope of the lien to crops planted within one year of the mortgage
date."'5
Even in those states which afford the most complete protection to mort-
gage liens, however, the mortgagee who has not taken possession of the crop
can never prevail over subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers who have
no notice of the mortgage, unless the instrument is recorded.1 6 Such re-
cording is generally deemed to give constructive notice of the lien, whether
the crop is planted or -unplanted,1 and even after it has been severed from
11. WALSH, op. cit. supra, note 6, § 8; Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired Per-
sonal Property (1906) 19 HARv. L. REv. 557, 559. The leading case in the field is gen-
erally said to be Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191 (1861).
12. Bodenhamer v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 50 Idaho 248, 295 Pac. 243 (1931),
(1931) 1 IDAHo L. J. 192; Wheeler v. Becker, 68 Iowa 723, 28 N. W. 40 (1886).
13. First Nat. Bank v. Felter, 65 Colo. 370, 176 Pac. 496 (1918) ; Holt v. Lucas,
77 Kan. 710, 96 Pac. 30 (1908). Under the New York rule, duly recorded mortgages
of after acquired property are valid against subsequent purchasers [Kribbs v. Alford,
120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811 (1890)] but not against creditors who have acquired a lien
on the mortgaged chattels before the mortgagee has taken possession. Rochester Dis-
tilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894). See Stone, The Equitable Mort-
gage in New York (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 519; Comment (1929) 3 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
139.
14. Kohler Improvement Co. v. Preder, 217 Wis. 641, 259 N. W. 833 (1935), (1936)
11 Wis. L. REv. 285. In Nebraska, future crop mortgages are ineffective even as be-.
tween the parties in the absence of an intervening act. Brown v. Neilson, 61 Neb. 765,
86 N. W. 498 (1901) ; see Ginsburg, Mortgages of After Acquired Personalty in Ne-
braska (1933) 11 NEB. L. BUL. 289, 299-302. In North Dakota mortgages on growing
and unharvested crops were recently abolished as a nuisance and as being against pub-
lic policy. N. D. Laws 1933, c. 150.
15. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. (1937) c. 95, § la; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp.
1937) §51-501; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 8290. Even
in the absence of statute, it has been held that an unlimited grant of future crops is
invalid. Shaw v. Gilmore, 81 Me. 396, 17 Atl. 314 (1889).
16. 1 JONES, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 157, 170, 190.
17. Whaley v. Bright, 189 Ala. 134, 66 So. 644 (1914) ; First Nat. Bank v. John-
son, 221 Mo. App. 31, 297 S. W. 724 (1927) ; see Note (1932) 77 A. L. R. 572. For a
summary of the statutory requirements of each state, see 1 JONES, op. cit. stupra note 7,
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the land,' 8 although, of course, in those states which do not recognize the
validity of the crop mortgagee's lien as against third parties, recording of
the instrument will not of itself validate a mortgage." An exception to
the theory of constructive notice is sometimes found in the distinction be-
tween annual and perennial crops such as fruit, since recordation of the
latter as a chattel mortgage is occasionally held not to afford valid notice
on the theory that such crops may be considered as part of the realty until
severed from the land;20 but the better view recognizes fruit as the product
of human labor and considers it personalty while still growing.- ' In any
case, record notice of crop mortgage liens is of limited duration, for it has
been the general practice to require such mortgages to be refiled within
a prescribed period of time, ranging from one to three years."2
The further problem of who may mortgage a future crop is particularly
complex because of the various requirements of interest which the courts
have prescribed. Thus, it has often been said that the mortgagor must have
some interest in the land upon which the crop is to grow at the time the mort-
gage is made, but what the nature and extent 'of this interest must be seems
to depend largely upon the particular rationalization which the court has
adopted to support the crop mortgage itself. In some jurisdictions a present
interest as owner or tenant is usually required, since otherwise there could
be no potential possession of the crop.2 In most jurisdictions, where the
equitable lien theory is in force, the mortgagor need only contemplate acquir-
ing an interest in the land, but the mortgage must contain an accurate descrip-
tion of the property so that the mortgaged crop may be identified and the
§§ 190-235; Hanna, Extension of Public Rccordation (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 617, 638-
641.
18. Truss -. Harvey, 120 Ala. 636, 24 So. 927 (1898); Wolf v. Carlton Bros., 10
S. W. (2d) 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ; IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums, Supp. 1937) § 51-518;
Wyo. REV. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 71-129. In some cases, the lien is only
effective while the crop remains on the mortgagor's land. Brande v. Babcock Hardware
Co., 35 Mont. 256, 88 Pac. 949 (1907) ; see CAL. CrV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 2972.
19. American State Bank v. Keller, 112 Neb. 761, 200 N. AV. 999 (1924) ; Rochester
Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894).
20. Nicholson v. People's Nat. Bank, 119 Okla. 113, 249 Pac. 336 (1926). This
difficulty has been obviated by many recent statutes which provide that chattel mort-
gages may be given on both annual and perennial crops. See, e.g., KAN. Gz:;. STAT.
AmN. (Corrick, 1935) § 58-322; MAss. ANN. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., Supp. 1936) c.
255, § 7A.
21. Congdon v. Wagner & Sons, 207 CaL 373, 278 Pac. 863 (1929); Tvin Falls
Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinberg, 44 Idaho 332, 257 Pac. 31 (1927), 54 A. L R. 1532
(1928).
22. See, e.g., Mich. Acts 1935, no. 129, § 13427; UTAir REv. STAT. Ain.. (1933)
§ 13-0-2.
23. Moring v. Helms, 210 Ala. 175, 97 So. 647 (1923), (1924) 37 Hnv. L. Rsv.
765; Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Watts, 251 Ky. 832, 66 S. V. (2d) 39 (1933);
Comment (1924) 10 VA. L. REv. 393, 395.
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intentions of the parties ascertained.24 Moreover, the prospective mortgagor
must have more than an actual or prospective interest in the land, for he
must also have an interest in the mortgaged crop itself. Hence a landlord
may not mortgage the crop of his tenant20r unless he has a fixed interest in a
specific part of it, as is often true of the crop-sharing relation.20 And al-
though a tenant will usually have sufficient interest in a crop to be raised by
him, 27 problems frequently arise when title to the crops is reserved to the
landlord by the terms of the lease.28 Under such a lease, a proper lessee-
mortgagor would appear to be one who could not be ousted before the end
of the term if all of his covenants were properly performed. 29 Thus, a ser-
vant receiving wages in the form of a share in the crop would not be entitled
to mortgage it.80 A possible solution of the crop-sharing problem is suggested
by an Alabama statute which declares that, whenever one person furnishes
the land, another the labor, and the crop is divided, a landlord-tenant rela-
tionship with all its incidents shall be deemed to exist.3 1
The concept that an interest in the crop is essential to the validity of a mort-
gage thereon is usually not satisfied by a mere potential interest at the time
the mortgage is made. Because of the generally accepted rules that mortgages
of after-acquired crops create no lien upon the land and that a lien attaches
to the crops only when they come into being, and then only to such interest
as the mortgagor has therein, it is necessary that the crops shall actually be
grown and that the mortgagor shall retain his interest at least until that time.3 2
The effect of this rule is to place the mortgagee peculiarly at the mercy of his
crop mortgagor, whose failure to plant the crop will inevitably destroy the
mortgage security.83  Furthermore, when the mortgagor owns the land, ter-
24. Iverson v. Soo Elevator Co., 22 S. D. 638, 119 N. W. 1006 (1909); Richardson
v. Washington, 88 Tex. 339, 31 S. W. 614 (1895); Community State Bank v. Martin,
144 Wash. 483, 258 Pac. 498 (1927) ; see Hogan v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 66 Minn. 344,
347, 69 N. W. 1, 2 (1896).
25. First Nat. Bank v. Crawford, 227 Ala. 188, 149 So. 228 (1933); Knaebel v.
Wilson, 92 Iowa 536, 61 N. W. 178 (1894); Williams v. King, 206 S. W. 106 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1918).
26. American Trust & Savings Bank v. Whitaker, 2 S. W. (2d) 356 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928) ; see Bowyer v. Beardon, 291 S. W. 219, 222 (Tex. Comm. of App. 1927);
cf. Devereaux Mortgage Co. v. Walker, 46 Idaho 431, 268 Pac. 37 (1928).
27. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Howell, 268 S. W. 776 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925) ; 1 Joxrs, op. cit. supra note 7, § 141.
28. This reservation may be held a chattel mortgage and required to be recorded
as such. Farmers' State Bank v. Benston, 29 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Joeckel
v. Gust, 217 Mo. App. 495, 268 S.W. 888 (1925) ; cf. Wilcox & Co. v. Deines, 119 Neb.
692, 230 N. W. 682 (1930). Contra: Merchants' State Bank v. Sawyer Farmers' Co-
operative Ass'n, 47 N. D. 375, 182 N. W. 263 (1921).
29. Minneapolis Iron Store Co. v. Branum, 36 N. D. 355, 162 N. W. 543 (1917);
see (1931) 9 NE. L. Buu.m 347 (distinction between tenant and cropper).
30. Booher v. Stewart, 75 Hun. 214, 27 N. Y. Supp. 114 (5th Dep't 1894).
31. AA. CoDE Azx. (Michie, 1928) § 8807.
32. 1 Joxas, op. cit. supra note 7, § 143a.
33. First Nat. Bank v. Brashear, 200 Cal. 389, 253 Pac. 143 (1927).
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mination of his interest therein by death,3 ' foreclosure,as lease, 0 or salea7
will also terminate his interest in the crop and will hence vitiate the mortgage
itself unless the crop was in being and the lien had attached prior to the
change of possession.38 It is possible, however, that a contrary result could be
reached in most of these situations through a rigid adherence to the doctrine
of "potential possession" on the ground that a present interest in the future
crops, superior to all subsequent claims, passes to the mortgagee upon the
execution of the mortgage.30 Where the mortgagor is merely a tenant, the
security afforded by a crop mortgage is even more uncertain, since the tenant
in certain instances may lose his right to the crop, and thus destroy his mort-
gagee's security, even after the crop has been planted. While ordinarily a
lessee is permitted to enter after the termination of his lease to harvest a crop
he has previously planted, 40 the doctrine of emblements, upon which this
right is based, does not apply when the contract is terminated through the
fault of the tenant, as by default in the payment of rent,41 or abandonment, 2
or surrender of the land.
43
A somewhat analogous problem arises in the event of a conflict between
a land and a crop mortgagee since the security of the crop mortgage must
certainly fail when foreclosure of the land mortgage effects a change of pos-
session before the mortgagor has planted his crop."4 But whether the crop
mortgagee's security is also destroyed by a foreclosure of the land mortgage,
34. Fawcett Investment Co. v. Rullestad, 218 Iowa 654, 253 N. V. 131 (1934),
(1935) 48 HAnv. L. REV. 123.
35. Louis v. Hansen, 205 Iowa 1216, 219 N. W. 523 (1928); ef. Zeigler v. Citizens'
Bank of Venus, 79 S. W. (2d) 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (sale of future crops).
36. McMaster v. Emerson, 109 Iowa 284, 80 N. NV. 389 (1899); Isbell v. Slette,
52 Mont. 156, 155 Pac. 503 (1916); cf. Daniel v. Clayton & Co., 25 Ala. App. 487, 149
So. 355 (1933) (mortgagor sold land but grew the crop as tenant of his grantee, and
crop mortgage upheld).
37. Snerly v. Stacey, 174 Ark. 978, 289 S. NV. 213 (1927). It seems that the mort-
gagee could provide against this contingency by obtaining, along with the crop mortgage,
an assignment of rents in case the crop should be raised by a tenant. Furthermore, it
can be argued that actual notice of the mortgage should render the mortgagor's land
grantee or tenant liable for inducing a breach of contract.
38. Congdon v. Wagner & Sons, 207 Cal. 373, 278 Pac. 863 (1929) ; N. Bar N. Land
& Livestock Co. v. Taylor, 94 Mont. 350, 22 P. (2d) 313 (1933).
39. State Bank v. St. Anthony & Dkota Elevator Co., 54 N. D. 264, 209 N. IV. 351
(1926) (lease of land prior to planting of crops did not destroy mortgage lien); see
(1935) 48 HARV. L. REv. 123.
40. It is often said that this doctrine only applies where the term was uncertain.
Commonwealth v. Galatta, 228 Mass. 308, 117 N. E. 343 (1917) ; see Jordan v. Din-
widdie, 205 S. W. 862, 863 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
41. Societa Italiana di Mutua Beneficenza v. Burr, 71 F. (2d) 495 (C. C. A. 9th,
1934); Francis Bros. v. Schallberger, 137 Ore. 529, 3 P. (2d) 530 (1931), 83 A. L R.
114 (1933).
42. Taack v. Underwood, 266 S. V. 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
43. Third Nat. Bank v. Kniffen, 143 Wash. 434, 255 Pac. 378 (1927).
44. See note 35, supra.
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subsequent to the planting, seems to depend upon varying interpretations of
the nature and extent of the land mortgagee's lien. It is a general rule that,
stipulations in the mortgage notwithstanding, a land mortgagee has no right
to the rents and profits from the mortgaged property until he acts to reduce
them to possession.45 Therefore, a crop mortgagee who forecloses after the
crop has been planted but before the land mortgagee has obtained possession
would undoubtedly prevail against the land mortgagee.46 When the land
mortgagee forecloses first, however, the decisions are divided as to which
lien shall have priority. In those jurisdictions which hold that the land mort-
gagee obtained no lien upon the unsevered crop prior to the foreclosure, his
lien will be subordinate to that of a crop mortgagee whose lien attached as
soon as the crop came into existence. 47 But when the land mortgagee's lien
is deemed to include both the land and the crops growing thereon in the first
instance, the crop and land mortgage liens will have attached simultaneously
upon the planting of the crop, and in such a case the crop mortgagee's lien
will be protected only if his mortgage was executed and recorded prior to
that of the land mortgagee.48 In determining at what point the land mort-
gagee obtained a lien upon the crop, the majority of courts do not consider
the inclusion of a rents and profits clause as significant,40 although in a few
jurisdictions the presence of such a clause is held to be of controlling im-
portance.50 This question has been specifically dealt with by an Iowa statute
which permits the indexing of land mortgages containing rents and profits
clauses in the chattel mortgage rec6rds.51 It seems, however, that this element
45. Teal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 242 (1884); 2 JoNEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)
§§ 975-976; Comment (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. REv. 851, 853; Note (1933) 91 A. L. R.
1217, 1225.
46. See In re Schilling, 251 Fed. 972, 974 (N. D. Ohio 1918) ; 1 JoNEs, op. cit. sutra
note 7, § 178. It has been held that a junior mortgagee who takes possession of the
property is entitled to the rents and profits as against the senior mortgagee, at least
until the latter has asserted his rights by obtaining the appointment of a receiver.
Lynch v. Donahoe, 205 Iowa 537, 215 N. W. 736 (1927); Sullivan v. Rosson, 223 N. Y.
217, 119 N. E. 405 (1918).
47. First Nat. Bank v. Garner, 91 Cal. App. 176, 266 Pac. 849 (1928); Southern
Trust Co. v. First City Bank & Trust Co., 259 Ky. 151, 82 S. W. (2d) 205 (1935) ; Kirby
v. First Nat. Bank, 131 Wash. 204, 229 Pac. 305 (1924) ; Note (1927) 47 A. L. R. 772.
48. Thompson v. Union Warehouse Co., 110 Ala. 499, 18 So. 105 (1895) ; Buchmann
v. Callahan, 222 Ala. 240, 131 So. 799 (1931); John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Watson, 200 Ill. App. 315 (1916) ; see Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 215
Iowa 700, 703, 246 N.W. 779, 780 (1933).
49. See Notes (1919) 4 A. L. R. 1405, 1410, (1928) 55 A. L. R. 1020, 1022.
50. Wilson v. Draper, 9 Ala. App. 585, 63 So. 779 (1913); Treat v. Dorman, 100
Cal. 623, 35 Pac. 86 (1893); see Anderson v. Marietta Nat. Bank, 93 Okla. 241, 243,
220 Pac. 883, 884 (1923) ; Notes (1933) 87 A. L. R. 625, 631, (1934) 91 A. L. R. 1217,
1225.
51. IOWA CODE (1935) § 10032. It was found that the policy of allowing the land
mortgage lien to attach only upon foreclosure encouraged mortgagors in distress to
lease and assign the rents just prior to the foreclosure proceedings. See Equitable Life
Insurance Co. v. Brown, 220 Iowa 585, 592, 262 N. W. 124, 128 (1935).
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of insecurity in crop mortgages could be obviated in all instances by means
of agreements whereby the land mortgagee would subordinate his interest in
the crop to that of a crop mortgagee who might, therefore, ex'tend further
credit to the mortgagor.5 2 The right of a crop mortgagee to enforce his lien
on the crops against one who has purchased the land at foreclosure sale is
also dependent upon the scope of the land mortgagee's lien, for if this lien
is held to include the unsevered crops in the first instance, the purchaser at
the sale will take a valid title thereto as against the crop mortgagee.5
The voluntary bankruptcy' 4 of the crop mortgagor raises still further prob-
lems-including the question of whether a mortgage lien on an unplanted crop
is affected by the discharge of the bankrupt. In general, it may be said that
valid liens given for a present consideration are not affected by such a dis-
charge,55 but since it is generally held that no crop mortgage lien exists be-
fore the planting of the crop,58 there is nothing to survive a discharge in
bankruptcy which occurs prior to that time ;r7 and no lien may arise there-
after, for there is then no debt to support it.'; A different result has been
reached in North Dakota, however, through adherence to the doctrine of
potential possession, whereby the mortgage is said to create a present lien on
a future crop which will survive the intervening discharge of the mort-
52. The statutory priority accorded by some states to landlords' and laborers' liens
could be similarly dealt with. Many recent statutes provide for the recordation of sub-
ordination agreements. See, e.g., IaD. STAT. ANN. (Bums, Supp. 1937) §51-512;
MAss. ANN. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., Supp. 1936) c. 255, § 7d. See note 91, infra.
53. Penryn Co. v. Sherman-Worrell Co., 142 Cal. 643, 76 Pac. 484 (1904); Jones
v. Adams, 37 Ore. 473, 59 Pac. 811 (1900) ; McCormick v. Terry, 147 Va. 44S, 137 S. E.
452 (1927) ; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 613 b.
A different result is reached in those jurisdictions which hold that a crop mortgage
works a constructive severance of the crop from the realty and removes it from the
purview of the land mortgage as effectively as would a physical severance. Tolland Co.
v. First State Bank, 95 Colo. 321, 35 P. (2d) 867 (1934); Hughes v. Summit Realty
Co., 120 Fla. 136, 162 So. 343 (1935); Red River Nat. Bank v. Summers, 30 S. V.
(2d) 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
Another element of insecurity to crop mortgagees is to be found in statutes granting
liens on the crops to landlords [see, e.g., ALA. CoDs AiN. (Michie, 1928) § 8799; Miss.
CODE ANN. (1930) § 2186] and to laborers. See, e.g., MoNI. Rrx. Coars Aimn. (Ander-
son & McFarland, 1935) §§ 8369, 8374.1.
54. Farmers are exempted from involuntary proceedings by § 4 b of the Bankruptcy
Act, 30 STAT. 547 (1898); 11 U. S. C. §22b (1934).
55. Bankruptcy Act § 67 d, 30 STAT. 564 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 107 d (1934); see
generally, 4 REMINGToN, BANKRur CY (4th ed. 1935) §§ 1943-1953.50.
56. See note 32, supra.
57. Sims v. Jamison, 67 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933). State law governs the
nature and validity of mortgage transactions, and when the lien attaches. Thompson
v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1905); Mason v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 71 F. (2d) 246
(C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
58. Butler Cotton Oil Co. v. Collins, 200 Ala. 217, 75 So. 975 (1917).
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gagor.59 The incidence of bankruptcy may also be peculiar to future crop
mortgages when an insolvent mortgagor plants the crop within four months
of the filing of the petition, although the instrument itself was executed and
recorded prior to that time, for it may be argued in such a case that the
planting of the crop constitutes a voidable transfer within the meaning of
Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act.60 It has been held in this situation,
however, that the lien relates back to the mortgage date and is valid accord-
ingly.61 This result seems sound since there is little cause for holding that
a preferential transfer occurs at this point. 2 The mere planting of a crop,
not theretofore among the assets of the bankrupt, should not be said to con-
stitute a depletion of his estate.63 Moreover, the planting of the crop within
the four months period should raise little question of invalidity because of
an intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, i.e., intent implicit in the
transaction itself, even though the loan made with the execution of the mort-
gage might then fail to qualify as "present" consideration. 4 The trustee,
who under Section 47a (2) occupies the position of a lien creditor as to all
property in the custody of the bankruptcy court and that of a judgment cred-
itor with execution returned unsatisfied as to all other property of the bank-
rupt,65 would be unable to attack such a transfer, since he only occupies that
position from the date when the petition is filed.0 6 Nor would he fare better
59. Thompson Yards, Inc. v. Richardson, 51 N. D. 241, 199 N. W. 863 (1924),
(1925) 19 ILL. L. REv. 365; Union Nat. Bank v. Lenton, 54 N. D. 262, 209 N. W. 350
(1926), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 506 (1927) ; cf. Waters v. Ellington & Co., 289 S. W. 417
(Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (crop planted after petition but before discharge).
60. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 96b (1934). This is on account of the pre-
vailing view that no lien arises until the crop is in being. See note 32, supra.
61. Moccasin State Bank v. Waldron, 81 Mont. 579, 264 Pac. 940 (1928) ; cf. Thomp-
son v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1905). In defense of this position, see WA.sH, op.
cit. supra note 6, § 12.
62. Preferential transfers *made within the four months period are voidable by the
trustee under the conditions specified in § 60b, 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 96b
(1934). A "transfer" is defined to include the actual mortgage transaction by § 1 (25),
30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 1 (25) (1934). And a preference given by a farmer,
though he is exempt from involuntary bankruptcy, may be avoided by his trustee ap-
pointed in a voluntary proceeding. Anderson v. Prosser, 157 Minn. 64, 195 N. W.
533 (1923).
63. There can be no preferential transfer unless the bankrupt parts with some of
his property for the benefit of a creditor. Newport Bank v. Herkimer Bank, 225 U. S.
178 (1912); First Nat. Bank v. Live Stock Nat. Bank, 31 F. (2) 416 (C. C. A. 8th,
1929) ; see Gn.LBET's CoLLnER, BANKRUP c Y (4th ed. 1937) § 1169. The slight extent to
which the use of seed and fertilizer involves a depletion should not alter the result,
especially when the mortgage is often an enabling loan for the purchase of these mate-
rials and may be favored as such. See Comment (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 891, 895.
64. Transfers with such intent are void as against creditors under Section 67e, 30
STAT. 564, (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 107e (1934). See Dodd v. Raines, 1 F. (2d) 658, 659
(N. D. Ga. 1924).
65. 30 STAT. 557 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 75a (2) (1934).
66. Bailey v. Baker- Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268 (1915).
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as representative of the bankrupt's creditors,r for no creditor armed with
process could secure a prior lien when that of the mortgage attaches the mo-
ment that the crop comes into being.
The time of recording the mortgage is thus material in determining whether
a preferential transfer has taken place. In those states which uphold the va-
lidity of mortgages upon future crops against the claims of third persons,
the mortgagee remains entitled to his security when the mortgage is recorded
and the crop planted prior to the four months period.0 8 Furthermore, the
mortgage lien should always prevail as against the trustee where the instru-
ment is recorded at the time when the loan is advanced, and the crop is plant-
ed prior to the discharge, since the Bankrupty Act preserves all liens given
in good faith and for a present consideration.0 When a previously executed
mortgage is recorded within the four months period, however, it will be open
to attack as a voidable preference provided that before its recordation claims
arose which under the local state law are entitled to priority. 0 Moreover,
it seems clear that the trustee in his several capacities will prevail over the
crop mortgagee who fails to record his lien until after the petition in bank-
ruptcy has been filed.71 When mortgages on future crops are invalid as
against creditors, their recordation is wholly ineffective 2 Hence, any attempt
67. Bankruptcy Act §§ 67a, b, 70e, 30 STAT. 564, 565 (1898), 11 U.S. C. §§ 107a, b,
110e (1934).
68. Only preferences given or recorded within the four months period are voidable
by the terms of § 60b. l re Spelman, 19 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) (despite
fact that farmer, at request of creditor, refrained from filing petition until after four
months from the mortgage date) ; cf. In re Pine Tree Lumber Co., 269 Fed. 515 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1920) ; see 4 RE.I i=-oN, op. cit. supra note 55, § 1773. Under § 70a (4) and e,
30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § l10a (4) and e (1934), however, fraudulent transfers
are not thus immune. Id. at § 1509.
69. Lake View State Bank v. Jones, 242 Fed. 821 (C. C. A. 7th, 1917) ; In re She-
poka, 32 F. (2d) 1011 (D. Neb. 1929) ; Bankruptcy Act § 67d, 30 SrAT. 564 (1893), 11
U. S. C. § 107d (1934). There should be no questioa of a voidable preference under
§ 60b when there is no pre-existing debt involved. See 4 Rasxac'roN, op. cit. supra note
55, § 1694.
70. In re Custer, 55 F. (2d) 718 (S. D. Ohio 1931) ; Foltz v. Davis, 63 F. (2d) 495
(C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Note (1933) 83 A. L. R. 1279, 1284. Likewise where possession
is taken under an unrecorded mortgage within the four months period. Haupt v. Moore,
77 F. (2d) 456 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Goldb~rg v. Brule Timber Co., 140 Minn. 335,
168 N. NV. 22 (1918).
When no creditor, under the local reccrding acts, has acquired a protected status
against the mortgage lien prior to the filing of the petition, the trustee can assert no
superior rights. It re Gibson, 65 F. (2d) 921 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) (recordation within
the four months period); Patnott v. Simpson, 35 F. (2d) 840 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929)
(possession taken within the four months) ; see Comments (1916) 29 HAnv. L Ray. 766;
(1935) 44 YA.Ai L. J. 109.
71. Farmers' State Bank v. Benston, 29 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928). See
1 JoNhFs, op. cit. supra note 7, § 242 a-c; 4 RE=GmIIoN, op. cit. supra note 55, § 1563. As
to the several capacities of the trustee, see notes 65, 67, supra.
72. See note 19, supra.
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to validate such transactions within the four months period, as by taking
possession of the crops 8 or by the substitution of a new instrument, 74 may
be avoided by the trustee. Renewal of a previously valid mortgage, however,
by a new instrument of equal amount does not constitute a voidable prefer-
ence even though the mortgagee was aware of the mortgagor's insolvency.7
Nor is refiling a valid mortgage a preferential transfer, unless effected after
a mandatory period,7 when it may be ineffective to restore the status of the
original mortgage as against the trustee.77 It may be noted that present Mort-
gages given to secure future advances are not for that reason preferential,
but are valid to the extent of the advances actually made. 8
In view of the many obstacles which beset the crop mortgagee in the pro-
tection of his lien, it may be doubted whether the crop mortgage device will
ordinarily afford adequate protection as security for a loan. But since the
government has found it necessary to use this security device for purposes
of relief, certain privileges have been afforded the federal agencies as crop
mortgagees. Thus, many states have passed statutes designed to protect the
crop mortgagee which are in many instances confined in their application to
federal agencies and other institutions having access to their discount facili-
ties. In a few states where crop mortgages are generally invalid as to cred-
itors, an exception has been made for federal agencies.7° In others, they have
been granted privileges not shared by the ordinary mortgagee. For example,
at least one statute attempts to grant them a present lien on a future crop
by the provision that their mortgages shall be effective at law from the date
of recording as against the claims of subsequent purchasers and execution
creditors.80 In several cases, the lien of the crop mortgage is made superior
to that of any mortgage or judgment lien upon the land, although an excep-
tion is commonly made of those land mortgages which were recorded prior
to the passage of the particular statute.8 ' The danger of perennial crops being
considered realty and thus not the proper subject for a chattel mortgage is
often obviated by the provision that they are to be considered personalty for
73. Grimes v. Clark, 234 Fed. (04 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916). The same is true when
identification of the mortgaged chattels is completed within the four months period,
since the lien is then created for the first time. First Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 68 Neb.
641, 94 N. W. 837 (1903).
74. Hayes v. Gibson, 279 Fed. 812 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922); In re Modell, 71 F. (2d)
148 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
75. Schreiber v. Colt, 80 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935).
76. In re Dagwell, 263 Fed. 406 (E. D. Ifich. 1920).
77. In re Active Wet Wash Laundry Co., 8 F. Supp. 964 (S. D. N. Y. 1934) (mort-
gage void after one year as against third persons if not refiled).
78. In re Great Lakes Lumber Co., 8 F. (2d, 96 (W. D. Pa. 1925).
79. See, e.g., N. Y. LIEN LAw, art. 10 (1934); N. D. Laws 1933, c. 145; PA. STAT.
(Purdon, 1936) tit. 21, §§ 931-935.
80. CoNN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1935) § 1591c.
81. See, e.g., DEL. REv. CODE (1935) § 3372; MD. CODE PuB. LocAL LAWS (Flack,
Supp. 1935) art. 21, § 54 B; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 21, § 931.
[Vol. 47: 99
GOVERNMENT CROP MORTGAGES
the purpose of the statute and mortgageable as such.82 Upon default, the
federal agency is also granted privileges special to itself. Under some stat-
utes, it may then take possession of the mortgaged property without process
of law and do all things necessary to preserve it, the expenses which are in-
curred theieby being included in and secured by the mortgage lienY3 In addi-
tion to the usual methods of foreclosure, the mortgage of the federal agency
may sometimes be foreclosed in any manner arranged for therein as, for in-
stance, by a power of sale.84 The extent of the lien is usually limited to crops
that will be planted within one year of the mortgage date,D and the mortgage
itself must almost invariably be refiled within a prescribed time ranging from
three to five years.8 6
In addition to the privileges granted it by the enabling statutes, the Farm
Security AdministrationS7 has resorted to further safeguards to protect its
loans. In jurisdictions where mortgages on future crops are invalid as against
creditors, the Administration often requires that the debtor promise in writ-
ing to execute a mortgage as soon as the crop comes into existence.18 It
seems, however, that such an agreement would not affect the crop with a
lien valid against third parties without notice, and consequently other liens
which attached prior to the execution and recordation of the actual mortgage
would enjoy priority. 9 Moreover, where such a mortgage is executed within
four months of the debtor's petition in bankruptcy, it should be open to at-
tack by the trustee as a voidable preference, since there is no present con-
82. See, e.g., AID. CODE PuB. LocAL LAWS (Flack-, Supp. 1935) art. 21, § 54 A; PA.
STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 21, § 931.
83. See, e.g., Dt.- REv. CoDE (1935) § 3372; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 21,
§ 934.
84. See, e.g., MID. CODE Pun. LocA. LAws (Flack, Supp. 1935) art. 21, § 54 N;
R_ I. Laws 1935, c. 2200, § 6.
85. See, e.g., DEL. Ray. CoDE (1935) § 3366; 1f1. CODE Puz. LocA. LAWS (Flack,
Supp. 1935) art. 21, § 54 A; N. H. LAws 1933, c. 43, § 1. In New Jersey, however, the
lien may extend to any crops grown during the existence of the mortgage. N. J. Laws
1934, § 4-178.
86. See, e.g., Comr. GE. STAT. (Supp. 1935) § 1591c; N. Y. Limz LAw, art. 10,
§ 7 (1934) ; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 21, § 932.
The statutes generally provide that these mortgages may also secure future advances
to be made at the option of the mortgagee, provided that they are made within a stipu-
lated time and do not exceed an aggregate amount stated in the mortgage. See, e.g.,
CoNN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1935) § 1591c; MD. CoD- Pun. LocA. Laws (Flack, Supp.
1935) art. 21, § 54 C; N. J. Laws 1934, § 4-185. In the absence of such statutes, the courts
are in conflict as to whether a mortgage can secure future advances against intervening
liens in cases where the mortgagee is not obligated to make them. See 1 JoIEs, op. d.
supra note 7, §§ 94-98; VALSH, op. cit. supra note 6, § 15.
87. See note 2, supra.
88. For the form of agreement, see STTuGEs, CASES oN CREDIT TnW sAcious (2d
ed. 1936) 385. The Farm Credit Association has also made use of these agreements.
Farm Credit Association, Form No. 1 (March 1; 1934) 5.
89. Hayes v. Gibson, 279 Fed. 812 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922); In re Traut's Estate, 297"
Fed. 458 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
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sideration to support the lien.90 A more effective safeguard is to be found in
the subordination agreements which the Farm Security Administration de-
mands from all other lienors. 91 These the Administration is in a particularly
favorable position to obtain both because of its large credit facilities and
because of its policy of lending to those farmers who are unable to secure
credit from other sources ;92 the various lienors will often waive whatever
rights they may have in a future crop, if the planting of that crop depends
upon funds which the farmer can obtain only through a government loan.
These subordination agreements should obviate the danger that liens which
arose prior to the crop mortgage may be superior to it under local law, 3
although, in those states which do not recognize the validity of crop mort-
gages as against third parties, they will not preclude the possibility of supe-
rior liens arising once the crop is in existence.94 But in the majority of
states, where the recording of the mortgage makes it effective against all
parties, these agreements should assure the security of the crop mortgagee. 0
Because of the increase in crop production which the government's policy
of credit extension to farmers will necessarily entail,90 it may, however, be
questioned whether extensive use of the crop mortgage device is entirely
desirable from an economic point of view-especially in the light of the gov-
ernment's policy of limiting production in order to assure higher and more
stable prices for farm commodities.9 7 The reason for this apparent con-
flict of policies probably lies in the fact that the distress of many farm fam-
ilies has made some form of monetary relief imperative. 8 But this conflict
may be avoided in part, at least, by means of the farm plans which each pros-
pective borrower from the Farm Security Administration agrees to follow
90. See note 74, supra.
91. For the form of the agreement, see STURGES, Op. Cit. supra note 88, at 387.
Such agreements have also been made use of by the Farm Credit Administration in
its crop financing activities. See U. S. Farm Credit Administration, loc. cit. supra note
88. These agreements are strictly construed. Irvine v. California Cotton Credit Corp.,
18 Cal. App. (2d) 761, 64 P. (2d) 782 (1937).
Most of the enabling statutes provide for the recordation of these agreements. See,
e.g., N. H. Laws 1935, c. 41, § 3; N. J. Laws 1934, § 4-180.
92. RESETTLEMENT ADmisTRATi oN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 8-9.
93. See notes 48, 53, stipra.
94. See notes 13, 14, supra.
95. See notes 17, 18, supra.
96. The Farm Security Administration makes grants to those farm families whose
financial status is such as to make the repayment of loans unlikely and also purchases
submarginal land, resettling the families who had been living there on more fertile soil.
See RESErtLEMENT ADmINISTRATION, op. cit. supra note 3, at 3; Tugwell, Changing
Acres (Sept. 1936) 44 CuR. HzsT. 59-63. It seems evident that these activities will also
increase crop production.
97. See Garrett, Plowing up Freedom (Nov. 16, 1936) 120 SAT. EV. PosT 16, 70.
Cf. President Roosevelt's "Fireside Chat" of October 12, 1937, N. Y. Herald Tribune,
Oct. 13, 1937, p. 7, col. 3.
98. See REs-Trm:ENT ADmSiOxisTrAox, op. cit. sulra note 3, at 3.
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